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37 
The BP Blowout and the Social and 
Environmental Erosion of the Louisiana 
Coast 
Daniel A. Farber* 
“There, shockingly, along the grassy bayou bank, I can now 
make out a dozen or so old tombs, all in different stages of 
submersion, tumbling brick by brick into the bayou water . . . . 
The bayou is swallowing the dead here.”1 This quote comes 
from a book, whose subtitle says it all: “The Rich Life and Trag-
ic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast.” The author, Mike Tid-
well, observes that the “whole ragged sole of the Louisiana 
boot, an area the size of Connecticut . . . is literally washing out 
to sea . . . taking with it entire Cajun towns and an age-old way 
of life.”2 But the Louisiana coast is not the only part of the Gulf 
that is in deep trouble, and the Cajuns are not the only group to 
suffer the consequences. 
Despite the attention the Gulf of Mexico (the Gulf) has re-
ceived since the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout, it may take 
years before the consequences of this disaster will be fully un-
derstood.3 All of this attention to the spill is warranted by the 
magnitude of the disaster. It risks, however, obscuring the con-
text surrounding the spill itself. Members of the public who 
were following events might well have supposed that the spill 
was a gigantic blot on an otherwise unblemished natural coast-
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 1. MIKE TIDWELL, BAYOU FAREWELL: THE RICH LIFE AND TRAGIC DEATH 
OF LOUISIANA’S CAJUN COAST 29 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 6. 
 3. See Cain Burdeau & Seth Borenstein, Gulf Survival: Scientists Lower 
Gulf Health Grade, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2010/10/19/gulf-survival.html. 
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line and thriving marine ecosystem. But even before the spill, 
the Gulf waters, the U.S. Gulf Coast, and the communities that 
live on the coast were all under threat.4 
The spill was only one more insult to a region already suf-
fering ongoing harm. In July 2010, an Associated Press survey 
asking Gulf scientists to rate the status of the Gulf on a 0 to 
100 scale, with 0 being dead and 100 being pristine, found the 
region to be a 71.5 In October, this number dropped only 6 addi-
tional points to 65.6 To explain this relatively small drop, one 
must understand the history of social and environmental ero-
sion of the Louisiana coast. 
Like the Gulf’s ecosystems, some human coastal communi-
ties were especially vulnerable to the incremental harm of the 
spill because of their already precarious positions. Also lost in 
the discussion of the oil spill’s impacts have been the dispropor-
tionate effects upon certain communities—communities that 
have been no strangers to the steady deterioration of the Gulf 
of Mexico. Long before oil began to spew into the Gulf of Mexico 
on April 20, 2010, the Gulf had been paying the price for un-
checked development, aggressive extraction of oil and natural 
gas, and an attitude of indifference to environmental conse-
                                                          
 4. See, e.g., ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE 16−17 (2010) 
(noting that since the nineteenth century scientists have raised concerns about 
the limits on the use of wetlands). At present, the definitive discussion of the 
spill itself seems to be NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL 
SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE 
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011) [hereinafter BP OIL SPILL COMM’N]. 
The National Commission also provides a good summary of the situation fac-
ing the Gulf today. 
The largest and most formidable challenges, however, are to bring 
balance and efficiency to the Gulf’s shared marine resources, and to 
address the rapid and continuous loss of wetlands, barrier islands, 
and shorelines comprising the Mississippi Delta and associated 
Chenier Plain of southwestern Louisiana. While many areas along 
the Gulf Coast require such restoration, the Mississippi Delta and the 
Gulf itself requires [sic] special attention. 
Id. at 199. 
While this article was in press, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task 
Force issued a preliminary draft of its policy recommendations which empha-
sizes the need to consider the spill in the context of the Gulf’s other environ-
mental problems and of the needs of coastal communities. See Press Release: 
Gulf Coast Task Force Releases Ecosystem Restoration Strategy, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/gulfcoasttaskforce/. 
 5. Burdeau & Borenstein, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
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quences.7 
The recent focus on the BP oil spill overlooks thousands of 
environmental indignities visited on the Gulf over the last sev-
eral decades. The Gulf is littered with around 4000 offshore oil 
and gas platforms and tens of thousands of miles of pipeline in 
the central and western Gulf of Mexico, where ninety percent of 
the country’s offshore drilling takes place.8 Even before the BP 
oil spill, over half a million gallons of oil had spilled in various 
accidents.9 The Gulf of Mexico has had to absorb the environ-
mental consequences of upriver use of fertilizers and pesticides 
and an array of point-source pollution.10 Bombs, chemical 
weapons, and other ordnance litter the Gulf’s floor, after fre-
quent dumping in the middle of the twentieth century.11 As we 
will see, these are only some of the threats facing the Gulf. 
This Article begins in Part I with a survey of the multitu-
dinous troubles facing the Gulf and its communities before the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. Those troubles range from a disap-
pearing coastline to invasive species and an aquatic dead zone. 
Part II discusses the spill itself and its impact. At present, the 
impacts of the spill do not seem to be as catastrophic as initial-
ly feared, but the spill has made a bad environmental situation 
worse. Part III then considers some affirmative steps that could 
help address the long-term deterioration of the Gulf Coast. 
Dramatic improvement would require expenditure of large 
amounts of federal money and passage of new federal legisla-
tion protecting the Gulf, neither of which seems likely at pre-
sent. However, while adding to the woes of the Gulf, the spill 
also provides opportunities to build institutional and informa-
tional infrastructure that, over time, can help slow or reverse 
the deterioration of the Gulf. 
It would be gratifying to offer a master plan for fixing the 
Gulf, but such a plan would be fruitless without a degree of po-
litical commitment that is unlikely in at least the next decade. 
There are many small initiatives that can cumulatively begin 
to make inroads on the Gulf’s problems, including, most obvi-
ously, efforts to ensure that the BP oil spill is not followed by 
similar disasters. Rather than attempting to catalogue all of 
                                                          
 7. Id. 
 8. Campbell Robertson, Gulf of Mexico Has Long Been Dumping Site, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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those potential initiatives, this Article focuses on efforts to 
build the governance and information infrastructure that can 
provide the framework for future initiatives. Combined with 
individual reform efforts, these institutional infrastructure im-
provements can have a synergistic effect, helping to energize 
and support future efforts in the same direction. 
In many ways, the situation in the Gulf is a preview of 
problems that will be facing the United States and the world in 
years to come due to climate change.12 Sea level rise is one of 
the most predictable effects of climate change.13 Apart from the 
unknown contribution of melting from Greenland and Antarcti-
ca,14 the simple change in temperature of the oceans will con-
tribute to thermal expansion, just as increased temperature 
causes the mercury in a thermometer to rise.15 This rise in sea 
level will result in loss of coastal lands,16 inundation of some 
estuary systems with salt water, salt water intrusions into 
some drinking sources, and increased exposure to flood dam-
age.17 Two-thirds of all U.S. coastal wetlands would be lost with 
a one-meter rise in sea level.18 In terms of ecology, even moder-
ate climate change will trigger significant extinctions.19 
                                                          
 12. For scientific background on climate change, see DAVID ARCHER & 
STEFAN RAHMSTORF, THE CLIMATE CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2010). 
 13. See, e.g., K. Hasselman et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate 
Change, 302 SCIENCE 1923, 1924 fig. 1 (2003) (predicting a two-meter increase 
in sea level under a “business as usual” scenario by year 2100, but only twenty 
centimeters under an optimum regulatory strategy). 
 14. NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 20 (2007); see also RICHARD ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4–5 (2007). 
 15. Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks. See Hans O. 
Portner & Rainer Knust, Climate Change Affects Marine Fishes Through the 
Oxygen Limitation of Thermal Tolerance, 315 SCIENCE 95 (2007). 
 16. A. BARRIE PITTOCK, CLIMATE CHANGE: TURNING UP THE HEAT (2005). 
Examples include China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the United States. 
Id. at 264, 268, 278. 
 17. See ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, 
NATURE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 123–24 (2006) (indicating that what are now 
hundred-year floods could become routine by late this century); see also 
PITTOCK, supra note 16, at 118 (stating that without adaptive measures, an-
nual flood losses would increase by ₤ 1–24 billion in different scenarios). 
 18. THOMAS R. KARL ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 84 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009). 
 19. Id. at 162. 
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The Gulf is already experiencing many of these ills, but 
scientists project even more severe changes due to climate 
change throughout the Southeast: loss of barriers to hurricane 
storm surges, rapid salt-water intrusion into coastal forests and 
freshwater aquifers, droughts leading to wildfires and drying of 
lakes, ponds, and wetlands, extinction of aquatic species, and 
declining fish and shellfish populations due to the rapid loss of 
coastal marsh are all possible.20 
In these respects, like the proverbial canary in the coal 
mine, what we see today in the Gulf Coast is an early warning 
indicator of trouble ahead. We will have to worry about disap-
pearing wetlands and other changes in many parts of the Unit-
ed States. The Gulf offers us the opportunity to learn how to re-
spond to these challenges before they become widespread. 
I. PUTTING THE BP OIL SPILL IN ITS CONTEXT 
What was the Gulf like before the big spill? We cannot un-
derstand the spill in isolation. Rather, we need to understand 
the human communities, geological changes, and ecosystems 
that were already in place before the spill. 
The Gulf is not just another coastal strip or water body, 
and its coastal communities are not fungible with those on the 
Atlantic or the Pacific shores. The Gulf Coast is home to some 
unique communities, having their own distinctive cultures and 
histories.21 These communities have long been under threat be-
cause of deterioration of fishing and because the very land on 
which they rest has begun to vanish into the water.22 These 
                                                          
 20. Id. at 115–16. The effect of the spill itself on these problems is not yet 
known. There is particular uncertainty about the effects on deep water biologi-
cal communities. According to the National Commission, 
Because the Deepwater Horizon spill was unprecedented in size, loca-
tion, and duration, deepwater ecosystems were exposed to large vol-
umes of oil for an extended period. It will take further investigation 
and more time to assess the impacts on these ecosystems, their extent 
and duration. Unfortunately, except for studies that have focused on 
rare and specialized communities associated with rocky outcrops or 
seeps, scientific understanding of the deepwater Gulf ecosystem has 
not advanced with the industrial development of deepwater drilling 
and production. 
 BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 182. 
 21. See generally VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 16 (“[W]e are all tangled up 
in a maze of pipelines, industry, and marine commerce that interacts with 
community, culture, recreation, and tourism . . . . [A] hodge podge of human 
activities.”). 
 22. Id. at 16−19. 
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communities are the subject of Part A. 
Part B discusses the environmental threats facing the Gulf 
even before the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. A recent esti-
mate is that environmental risks could cost the Gulf as much 
as $350 billion in economic loss over the next twenty years; no-
tably, one sponsor of the study was Swiss Re, a leading interna-
tional reinsurance company.23 The harm done by the BP oil 
spill is an add-on to the other impeding threats. 
Part C discusses the barriers that have long prevented ef-
fective response to these issues. The Gulf has sometimes 
seemed as distinctive in its resistance to environmental protec-
tion as in its ecology and culture. Much of the information 
needed to address problems in the region is yet to be developed, 
so too for the governance structure to implement solutions. 
These longstanding barriers will not give way overnight, but 
Part III of the article will suggest some incremental efforts to 
address them. 
A. COASTAL COMMUNITIES 
Other parts of the country were founded by farmers and 
ranchers. Before oil and gas development, however, the Gulf 
Coast was primarily used for fishing, trapping, and transporta-
tion.24 Even today, it is home to fishing communities with 
unique histories and cultures. The earliest non-native inhabit-
ants of the coast were refugee Acadians from Canada.25 The 
modern-day Cajuns are the descendants of the Acadians ex-
pelled from modern day Nova Scotia and resettled in the 
marshes of Louisiana.26 The Cajuns settled on the coast be-
cause other cultures had already laid claim to much of the in-
land territory, but they found that there was little agricultural 
land available among the marsh and swamp lands.27 Tradition-
ally, farmers—the displaced Acadians—were forced to adapt to 
a lifestyle focused on fishing.28 From these unique marshland 
                                                          
 23. News Release, Entergy, Entergy Study Finds Environmental Risks 
Could Coast Gulf Coast $700 Billion (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.entergy.com/ 
news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=1906. 
 24. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 16. 
 25. Herbert R. Padgett, Physical and Cultural Associations on the Louisi-
ana Coast, 59 ANNS. ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 481, 481 (1968). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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beginnings, the Cajuns of Louisiana developed a distinct and 
complex cultural identity, expressed in language, food, dance, 
folklore, and other traditions.29 Cajun culture is not unitary; 
rather, “Cajun identity is so distinct that each town often has 
its own cuisine, musical style, and dialect.”30 
The oil spill has threatened Cajun culture because it chal-
lenges traditional fishing livelihoods and threatens to under-
mine the Cajun tradition of self-reliance. Many of the small 
fishing communities in the Louisiana coastal zone have been in 
existence for 200 years or more.31 These communities turned to 
capturing “fish, crawfish, frogs, and the collection of Spanish 
moss (used for mattress filler),” and selling these products to 
nearby New Orleans.32 As fishing technology developed in the 
1950s and 60s, these communities increasingly relied on salt-
water fisheries and shellfisheries for their livelihood.33 As the 
bounty of the Gulf declines along with the region’s environ-
ment, the Cajun people face greater uncertainty when they 
take to their fishing boats. 
In addition to Cajuns, the coast is also home to around 
20,000 Native Americans.34 For instance, tribes in southern 
Louisiana depend on marshlands that were inundated by Hur-
ricanes Rita and Katrina, with eighty percent of the homes 
flooded.35 
Besides these coastal communities, other aspects of the re-
gion are connected with the coast. Although not (yet) physically 
on the coast, New Orleans is closely tied to the coastal ecosys-
tem. If all the wetlands were lost, the city would only be twen-
ty-five miles from the coast and even more vulnerable to hurri-
canes.36 Shipping is a key industry, further tying the city to the 
coast.37 Although jazz has been replaced by hip hop and rap as 
popular music, the city retains a distinctive culture with “the 
                                                          
 29. Mark Guarino, BP Oil Spill Imperils Cajun Culture, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0806/ 
BP-oil-spill-imperils-Cajun-culture. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 142. 
 35. Id. 
 36. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW 
ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 12 (2006). 
 37. Id. at 31. 
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bohemian-anarchistic-libertarian mix of an international port 
city.”38 
New Orleans is also home to vulnerable communities. Prior 
to Hurricane Katrina, two-thirds of the population was African 
American.39 During the post-World War II industrial boom, the 
chemical and plastics industries built up factories in disenfran-
chised, predominantly black neighborhoods.40 Each year these 
industrial complexes release millions of pounds of carcino-
gens.41 In Mossville, Louisiana, residents have three times the 
dioxin level of the national average.42 The Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights has agreed to hear a petition 
from residents of Mossville.43 It is the first environmental case 
from the U.S. to go before the Commission.44 Minority commu-
nities were also impacted by more recent events. Many com-
munities of Asian Americans (especially Vietnamese) were dev-
astated by hurricanes in New Orleans and by the decline in the 
fishing industry.45 
These communities should be subjects of special concern 
for several reasons. First, they are often politically and econom-
ically disempowered, ill-prepared to protect their own interests 
either in the political arena or the marketplace. Second, these 
communities and their unique cultures are not readily portable. 
If their livelihoods, lands, or homes are destroyed, individuals 
may relocate but communities’ ties and distinctive cultures 
may be lost. In a society where migration and mass media tend 
to homogenize our culture, we should prize these unique com-
munities and their distinctive histories. 
B. THE GULF ECOSYSTEM 
When the BP oil spill began, the Gulf of Mexico was al-
ready suffering the effects of a century of environmental ne-
glect. The spill was simply the latest blow to a damaged ecosys-
                                                          
 38. Id. at 29, 47. 
 39. Id. at 33. 
 40. Ike Sriskandarajah, Living on Earth, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Apr. 26, 
2010), http://www.pri.org/science/environment/human-rights-in-cancer-alley 
1965.html. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 142. 
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tem. This section surveys the preexisting problems: disappear-
ing wetlands, a growing dead zone, and threatened biodiversi-
ty. Because so many coastal communities depend on fishing for 
their livelihoods, these communities are inevitably impacted 
when ecosystems are eroded by human activities. Indeed, many 
of them are seeing the very land beneath their feet erode away. 
1. Disappearing Wetlands 
Disappearing wetlands are in some ways the most obvious 
of the Gulf’s problems. Their disappearance is a particular con-
cern because they provide benefits that extend far beyond the 
swamplands and marshes themselves. Coastal wetlands pro-
vide many ecological services: 
In addition to storm protection services, the Louisiana coastal plain 
provides many other benefits. It offers habitat for countless species, 
including commercially significant sea life and waterfowl. Fisheries in 
the Gulf of Mexico provide about [twenty] percent of all seafood con-
sumed in the United States. Nearly all of that catch is dependent, in 
some way, on the universe of microscopic plant and animal life first 
nurtured in the coastal plain. With more than five million birds win-
tering in Louisiana, the Louisiana coastal plain provides crucial rest 
stops to migrating birds. Finally, Louisiana’s coastal marshes provide 
services that are vital to water quality. . . . The coast’s storm protec-
tion, habitat, and water treatment services, while impossible to pre-
cisely quantify, surely amount to billions of dollars of commercial 
benefit per year.46 
Since the 1930s, however, one-third of Louisiana’s wet-
lands, an area the size of Delaware, has disappeared.47 Data 
from a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wetlands survey show 
that, though the rate of loss has slowed, Louisiana is still losing 
32,000 acres of wetland every year.48 At the current rate of wet-
land loss, by the year 2040, Louisiana will have lost more than 
                                                          
 46. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 18–19. According to the National Commis-
sion, the Gulf Coast produces more than one third of domestic seafood supply, 
diverse fish nursery and feeding grounds, and “some of the best beaches and 
waters in the United States for recreation and tourism.” BP OIL SPILL 
COMM’N, supra note 4, at 187. “Coastal tourism and commercial fisheries gen-
erate more than $40 billion of economic activity annually in the five Gulf 
States.” Id. 
 47. Ken Wells, Collapsing Gulf Marsh Dwarfs Oil Spill as Ecological Dis-
aster, STATESMAN.COM (Sep. 7, 2010, 9:41 PM), http://www.statesman.com/ 
news/nation/collapsing-gulf-marsh-dwarfs-oil-spill-as-ecological-902420.html 
(footnote omitted). 
 48. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLAND EXTENT, CHANGE, AND 
SOURCES OF CHANGE, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index 
.cfm?fuseaction=detail.viewInd&lv=list.listByAlpha&r=188230&subtop=202. 
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one million acres of coastal wetlands since 1978. As a result, 
fisheries could decline by thirty percent and wildlife dependent 
on the marshes would suffer.49 Louisiana’s wetlands account for 
forty percent of total wetlands in the continental United States, 
and the state also accounts for eighty percent of wetlands lost.50 
There are multiple causes of the rapid loss of these freshwater 
wetlands: levees along the Mississippi built in 1927 prevent silt 
from reaching the wetlands, natural contraction of peat soils, 
and geological settling.51 While it is difficult to attribute a per-
centage of environmental degradation to human activities, the 
offshore drilling industry has substantially contributed to the 
rapid destruction through dredging for drilling rigs, pipelines, 
and navigation channels.52 
After the catastrophic levee failures that allowed Hurri-
cane Katrina’s floodwaters to advance into the heart of New Or-
leans, efforts to restore and enhance the city’s flood protection 
system have largely failed to consider the effects of human de-
velopment upon the region’s natural defenses.53 Louisiana’s 
wetlands are an incredible ecological resource, and their steady 
destruction left the city more vulnerable than it otherwise 
would have been.54 Further, wetlands are essential to the 
health of Louisiana’s fish and seafood industry, they shelter 
and feed five million migratory birds annually, filter pollutants 
from the water, and help slow storm surges.55 The barrier is-
lands in the Gulf of Mexico have also gradually disintegrated, 
at least in part due to human activities, leaving the vast sys-
tem of sheltered wetlands along Louisiana’s delta plain increas-
ingly exposed to open-gulf conditions.56 
In addition to increased erosion, coastal wetlands have also 
suffered because of declines in the countervailing forces that 
build and maintain the lands. After floods in 1927, the United 
                                                          
 49. COASTAL WETLANDS, PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ACT, MANAGING 
AGENCIES, WETLAND LOSS IN LOUISIANA (1997), http://www.lacoast.gov/rep 
orts/rtc/1997/5.htm. 
 50. Judith Perhay, Louisiana Coastal Restoration: Challenges and Con-
troversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149, 155 (2000). 
 51. Wells, supra note 47. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Bob Sullivan, Wetlands Erosion Raises Hurricane Risks, 
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 29, 2005, 9:17 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9118570/. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Wells, supra note 47. 
 56. Sullivan, supra note 53. 
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States built levees along the Mississippi that have prevented 
silt from reaching Louisiana wetlands.57 Since the construction 
of these levees, wetlands have been starved of sediment, caus-
ing them to “become waterlogged, sink and die.”58 The silt ends 
up uselessly collecting at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.59 
Thus, efforts to reduce flooding in the Mississippi River basin 
have increased the risk of flooding along the coast of the Gulf of 
Mexico.60 
After Hurricane Katrina, it became apparent that the dis-
appearance of the wetlands created a major risk to the region.61 
Wetlands absorb the impact of storms, slowing them down once 
they make landfall.62 Storm surges are reduced by approxi-
mately one foot for every 2.7 miles of wetlands.63 However, New 
Orleans is now increasingly exposed to violent storms because 
so many of the wetlands have collapsed, in part due to the levee 
system that surrounds the city.64 In addition, barrier islands 
provide protection for “half a million people from violent 
storms, along with an international commercial-industrial 
complex worth billions.”65 Yet, these barrier islands are rapidly 
disappearing.66 
The problems discussed in this section are on the landward 
side of the coastline. All is far from well, however, on the sea-
ward side. There are several other major threats to the health 
of the Gulf ecosystem, which are discussed in the next two sub-
sections. 
2. The Dead Zone 
The dead zone is an unmistakable sign that the marine 
ecosystem is under threat. An 18,000 square kilometer seasonal 
“dead zone” of low dissolved oxygen threatens marine life on 
the Texas-Louisiana shelf. First recognized in the 1970s, the 
Gulf of Mexico dead zone is the largest in the Western Hemi-
                                                          
 57. Wells, supra note 47. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Sullivan, supra note 53. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 34. 
 66. Id. at 34–35. 
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sphere.67 The size of the dead zone varies from year to year, but 
at its largest, in 2002, it covered 22,000 square kilometers—an 
area as large as the state of Massachusetts.68 Research sug-
gests that fertilizer leaching from agricultural production along 
the Mississippi River may be responsible for the river’s nutri-
ent loading and hypoxia which causes the dead zone.69 Thus, 
the zone is at its worst during peak farming months, from May 
till September. The Mississippi watershed drains forty-one per-
cent of the land area of the contiguous United States.70 More 
than half of the estuaries that experienced a hypoxic event are 
in the Mississippi River plume.71 
Dead zones throughout the world have spread exponential-
ly since the 1960s—the Gulf being a prime example.72 The area 
of hypoxia shrinks to less than 5000 square kilometers during 
years with low river flow.73 However, the dead zone more than 
triples in size during periods of high flow.74 While climate 
change promises to have complicated effects on the dead zone, 
climate models predict that climate change will deplete oceanic 
oxygen by increasing stratification and change rainfall patterns 
so as to cause increased discharges from the Mississippi Riv-
er.75 
Even apart from climate change, however, the situation is 
very serious. Each spring, a massive slug of nutrients flows 
down the Mississippi River and empties into the Gulf of Mexi-
co, forcing aquatic life to flee or else suffocate.76 Hypoxia leaves 
habitats inhabitable. For example, “[i]n marine systems, when 
oxygen levels fall to within 1.0–2.0 ml/liter, mobile organisms, 
                                                          
 67. EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARINE DEAD ZONES: 
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 7 (2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Con-
sequences for Marine Ecosystems, 321 SCIENCE 926, 926 (2008). 
 73. Id. at 928. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 929. 
 76. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Mas-
sive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010). For detailed scientific information about the hy-
poxia issue, see ELIZABETH B. JEWETT ET AL., COMM. ON ENV’T AND NATURAL 
RES., SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF HYPOXIA IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS 11–22 
(2010). 
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such as pelagic fish, begin to migrate out of the affected area.”77 
The current and future potential effects upon Gulf species of 
the growing hypoxic region include: “(1) altered coastal phyto-
plankton based food webs, (2) noxious algal blooms, (3) altered 
benthic ecosystems, (4) reduced economic productivity in both 
commercial and recreational fisheries, and (5) both direct and 
indirect impacts on fisheries, such as direct mortality and al-
tered migration which may lead to declines in populations and 
landings.”78 
Despite the destruction to life, the federal government has 
been unable or unwilling to take substantial action to limit the 
upriver fertilizers and manures causing the damage.79 
A thirty percent decrease in the Mississippi River nitrate 
influx, according to model simulations, would reduce the fre-
quency of hypoxia by thirty-seven percent.80 However, a twenty 
percent increase in Mississippi River discharge, thought possi-
ble as a result of climate change, would increase the frequency 
of hypoxia by the same amount.81 Therefore, if climate change 
does substantially increase discharges, it may be necessary to 
decrease nitrogen flux by more than thirty percent if policy-
makers become serious about addressing hypoxia.82 
3. Threats to Biodiversity 
The Gulf of Mexico is home to twenty-eight species of ma-
rine mammals, including six that are listed under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) as endangered.83 Five species of turtles 
in the region are listed under the ESA.84 These animals are 
concentrated in areas that provide shelter, feedings, and places 
suitable for reproduction.85 The extent to which these optimal 
                                                          
 77. Mary L. Belefski & Larinda T. Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: 
A Historical and Policy Perspective, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 335 (1999). 
 78. Id. at 338. 
 79. See BUCK, supra note 67, at 13–16. 
 80. Nancy Rabalais et al., Simulated Responses of the Gulf of Mexico Hy-
poxia to Variations in Climate and Anthropogenic Nutrient Loading, 42 J. 
MARINE SYSTEMS 115, 115–126 (2003). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., AN OVERVIEW OF PROTECTED 
SPECIES COMMONLY FOUND IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 5 (2006), 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdf/Protected%20Species%20In%20GOM-web 
%20version%202-7-08.pdf. 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. Id. at 8. 
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habitats have suffered as a result of the oil spill depends upon 
whether oil comes into contact with these habitats.86 However, 
because much oil and gas extraction occurs in or near habitats 
of protected species, there is a particular danger when a spill 
occurs.87 The risks of a spill are amplified because oil-drilling 
platforms serve as underwater islands that often provide artifi-
cial habitat to a wide array of species.88 Rapid, severe declines 
in coastal and oceanic shark populations in the northwest At-
lantic and Gulf of Mexico have led to population loss of ninety-
nine percent of some species.89 
The Bluefin tuna is a species in the Gulf that is being 
closely monitored in the wake of the oil spill.90 Since 1950, the 
Bluefins have been in rapid decline.91 A twenty-year plan to re-
build the stock has utterly failed.92 A new model suggests that 
two cyclonic eddies—preferred spawning areas for the Bluefin 
tuna—were substantially contaminated by the oil spill at the 
exact time that spawning should be occurring.93 The Bluefin is 
now under consideration for listing as an endangered species.94 
The Bluefin is representative of many struggling species in the 
Gulf of Mexico that could be dealt a fatal blow by the oil spill. 
Climate change promises to have many complex, and most-
ly negative, effects on the Gulf of Mexico. Rising waters will in-
crease coastal erosion.95 Indeed, as early as 1990, Congress 
made an official finding that “[t]here is a growing need to plan 
                                                          
 86. BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 178. 
 87. Id. at 83. 
 88. Id. at 174–75. (discussing how the spill also impacted the deepwater 
bathypelagic zone, which contains cold-water corals, fish, bacteria, mussels 
and tubeworms, as well as diving sperm whales). 
 89. Andrea Thompson, Shark Population Collapse Causing Other Species 
to Vanish, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,262486,00.html. See generally BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 
178 (discussing that species with essential habitats near the spill included 
sharks of various kinds, swordfish, marlin tuna, and sailfish). 
 90. BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 180–81. 
 91. Julia Whitty, Bluefin Tuna Spawning Mid-Spill Right Now, MOTHER 
JONES (May 28, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/05/ 
bluefin-tuna-spawning-mid-spill-right-now. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Allison Winter, Gulf Spill Spurs U.S. to Weigh Protections for Bluefin 
Tuna, GREENWIRE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/ 
print/2010/10/12/21. 
 95. KARL ET AL., supra note 18, at 12. 
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for sea level rise” in light of global warming and its effect on 
sea level.96 Most importantly, marine habitats have already 
suffered significant losses for a variety of reasons—including 
coastal agricultural, industrial, and urban development.97 Cli-
mate change is expanding the range of some fishes and de-
creasing the range of others with unpredictable results.98 While 
some foundation species may be able to keep pace with changes 
to the ecosystem by migrating landward, this depends on water 
rising at a sufficiently slow rate. A recent study found regional 
increases in air and sea surface temperatures of greater than 
3ºC over a thirty-year period.99 This change in temperature cor-
relates with northern shifts in the distribution of warm water 
fishes in the Gulf of Mexico.100 
Circulation patterns and the input of freshwater drive 
productivity and connectivity within the Gulf of Mexico.101 The 
movement of three species of fish, the Atlantic goliath grouper, 
red grouper, and tilefish is in part controlled by these circula-
tion patterns and the flow of freshwater.102 In turn, these fishes 
have a profound shaping effect upon their habitats, which like-
ly influences the livelihood of many other species in the Gulf.103 
Biodiversity exists in a delicate balance, and climate change 
may have a disruptive effect upon this balance.104 
Invasive species are also a threat to the Gulf ecosystem. 
The Gulf of Mexico Program (GMP) sponsors a multi-
stakeholder Invasive Species Focus Team, focusing on shrimp 
viruses, ballast water, and the prevention of new introductions 
of invasive species.105 The majority of the Invasive Species Fo-
cus Team’s efforts have been on addressing the first two of the-
                                                          
 96. Coastal Zone Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, § 6202(a)(7), 104 Stat. 1388-300 (1990). 
 97. Felicia Coleman & Christopher Koenig, The Effects of Fishing, Cli-
mate Change, and Other Anthropogenic Disturbances on Red Grouper and 
Other Reef Fishes in the Gulf of Mexico, 50 INTEGRATIVE & COMP. BIOLOGY 
201, 208 (2010). 
 98. Id. at 208–09. 
 99. Joel Fodrie et al., Climate-Related, Decadal-Scale Assemblage Chang-
es of Seagrass-Associated Fishes in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, 16 GLOBAL 
CHANGE BIOLOGY 48, 48 (2009). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Coleman & Koenig, supra note 97, at 202. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 204–05. 
 104. Id. 
 105. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 855-R-00-003, AN INITIAL SURVEY OF AQUATIC 
INVASIVE SPECIES ISSUES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO REGION 4 (2000). 
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se three.106 The GMP works with the five Gulf States to develop 
action plans “to minimize introductions and impacts of invasive 
species.”107 Twenty-five of seventy-five non-indigenous species 
in the Gulf of Mexico are fish species.108 At least ten of these 
were deliberate introductions.109 An additional fifteen fish spe-
cies represent unintentional releases from aquaria.110 Thus, 
with an eye to fishing, human demands have been put before 
the natural balance of the Gulf. While GMP may strive to re-
verse the trend towards the proliferation of invasive species, it 
is unclear whether its efforts can cancel out the forces that 
have brought so many invasive species to the Gulf in the first 
place. 
C. BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE GULF 
The Gulf is blessed in many respects, but the capacity to 
protect the regional environment is not one of them. The Gulf is 
backward in environmental matters. Commitment to regula-
tion and scientific research in the Gulf States has always 
lagged behind other areas of the United States.111 The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) funding for the Gulf is a 
fraction of what is allocated to the Chesapeake Bay Program 
and Great Lakes Program.112 Environmental groups in the Gulf 
are poorly organized and lack resources, and many of the prom-
inent nation-wide environmental groups do not have an office 
in the region.113 Because of lack of support from the Gulf 
States, many environmental groups have been hesitant to 
commit resources to the Gulf region.114 A culture of environ-
mental disinterest has been fostered in the Gulf States largely 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 40. 
 107. Id. at 4. 
 108. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ERDC/TN ANSRP-05-4, INVASIVE AND 
ESTUARINE ANIMALS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 3 (2005). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. According to the National Commis-
sion, “[u]nfortunately, comprehensive data on conditions before the spill—the 
natural ‘status quo ante’ from the shoreline to the deepwater Gulf—were gen-
erally lacking.” BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 174. 
 112. Laura Tuma, The Gulf of Mexico Gets a Helping Hand, TEX. 
COMMISSION ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/comm 
_exec/pubs/pd/020/04-04/gulf-x.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
 113. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. 
 114. Id. 
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because these state governments fear the economic conse-
quences of more rigid enforcement of environmental laws.115 
The Gulf States have often resisted tougher regulations or 
stricter enforcement of existing regulations because of fears 
that such changes could chase away much needed jobs.116 With 
complicit states and the absence of watchdog environmental 
groups, environmental violations often go unreported or unpun-
ished.117 Kieran Suckling of the Center for Biological Diversity 
remarked, “The environmental movement was either so far re-
moved from it that it was unaware, or it was aware and afraid 
to challenge it because of local politics . . . . Or it was unwilling 
to challenge because it has written off the gulf as America’s 
dumping ground.”118 Notably, of a thousand lawsuits filed by 
environmental groups against federal agencies regarding inad-
equate or absent environmental impact statements, only one 
involved oil and gas operations in the Gulf.119 
While organizations like Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Center for Biological Diversity, and Earthjustice have offic-
es in the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes regions, they have 
no presence in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi.120 
Earthjustice does have an office in Florida, but its office ap-
pears to be primarily concerned with the Everglades and other 
Florida-specific environmental issues.121 While the oil spill did 
grab these organizations’ attention, it is unclear whether they 
will remain involved in the Gulf of Mexico now that the crisis is 
over. As discussed in Part III, it is important to obtain addi-
tional funding to make this feasible. 
The challenges facing the Gulf of Mexico are many and 
daunting. Although the Clean Water Act has been effective at 
                                                          
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Mike Soraghan, Gulf Spill: Enviro Groups Ignored Gulf Before BP 
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES: GREENWIRE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/09/27/27greenwire-enviro-groups-ignored-gulf-before-bp-disaster-
96055.html. 
 120. See About NRDC, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
http://www.nrdc.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); Contact Us, CTR. FOR 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/about/contact/in 
dex.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); Contact Us, EARTH JUSTICE, 
http://earthjustice.org/about/contact (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 121. See Florida, EARTH JUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/about/offices/flor 
ida (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
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regulating point source pollution from specific factories and 
waste plants throughout much of the country, nonpoint source 
pollution has been intractable.122 The Gulf of Mexico may pro-
vide the most blatant example of the disastrous effects of this 
regulatory shortcoming. Many upstream states contribute to 
the growing dead zone problem in the Gulf of Mexico, and even 
if the Gulf States could mobilize to address environmental 
problems, the upstream states would have little incentive to 
reduce the nitrogen and other chemicals flowing down the Mis-
sissippi River.123 While national environmental groups might 
be able to bring attention to the complex environmental issues 
facing the Gulf of Mexico, members of these groups have found 
much of the Gulf to be a hostile fundraising and political at-
mosphere.124 For decades, the Gulf States have fostered a lax 
political culture that prioritizes business interests over ecosys-
tem health.125 The Gulf States are among the poorest in the na-
tion, and their state governments fear the economic conse-
quences of more rigorous environmental laws and 
enforcement.126 
When all these obstacles are considered together, it is ap-
parent that there will be no silver bullet for the Gulf of Mexico. 
As it has taken many generations to create such a dramatic en-
vironmental problem in the region, it may take a serious com-
mitment of economic and scientific resources over a comparable 
period of time to significantly restore the Gulf of Mexico. 
II. THE BP OIL SPILL AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The Gulf of Mexico received national headlines for weeks 
during the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The spill is de-
scribed in Part A of this section, while its impact, particularly 
on vulnerable communities, is discussed in Part B. 
A. THE SPILL 
An informed observer in the spring of 2010 would have 
known that the situation in the Gulf was not good. But things 
were about to get even worse. On April 20, 2010, while drilling 
                                                          
 122. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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at the Macondo Prospect about fifty-two miles southeast of 
Venice, Louisiana, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon 
caused by a blowout killed 11 of 126 crewmen.127 Two days lat-
er, despite efforts to put out the blaze on the oil rig, the 
Deepwater Horizon sank in 5000 feet of water.128 On April 23, 
the Department of Homeland Security stated the incident “pos-
es a negligible risk to regional oil supply markets and will not 
cause significant national economic impacts.”129 White House 
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, too, minimized the nature of the 
incident, announcing, “I doubt this is the first accident that has 
happened and I doubt it will be the last.”130 However, on this 
same date, President Obama issued a statement identifying the 
blowout as a “number one” priority, and BP officials acknowl-
edged the threat of catastrophic environmental consequenc-
es.131 
On April 24, 2010, oil was confirmed to be leaking from the 
well, and the next day the U.S. Coast Guard announced its in-
tention to use remote underwater vehicles to stop the leak.132 
Throughout the end of April, May, and June, estimates of the 
flow of oil increased from 1000 barrels of crude per day (bpd), to 
5000 bpd, to as many as 60,000 bpd.133 For perspective, this 
could mean that an amount of oil equal to the Exxon Valdez 
spill could have been gushing into the Gulf of Mexico every four 
days.134 At least one expert predicted the spill flow was even 
                                                          
 127. Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Fire Leaves 11 Missing, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Apr. 21, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2010/apr/21/deepwater-horizon-oil-rig-fire. 
 128. BP Oil Spill Timeline, GUARDIAN, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/29/bp-oil-spill-timeline-
deepwater-horizon. For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the 
spill, see BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 89–122. The Commission 
identifies management failures by industry and a dysfunctional regulatory 
system as “root causes” of the blowout. Id. at 122–27. The accident resulted 
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drilling. Id. at 127. 
 129. BP Oil Spill Timeline, supra note 128. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Suzanne Goldenberg, Fear of Ecological Disaster Played Down After 
Oil Rig Collapse in US, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 24, 2010, at 36. 
 132. BP Oil Spill Timeline, supra note 128. 
 133. Justin Gillis, Estimates of Oil Flow Jump Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 15, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/us/16spill.html. 
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higher than 60,000 bpd.135 
In May 2010, Congress learned that BP, Halliburton Com-
pany, and Transocean Ltd. ignored safety warnings in the 
hours before the Deepwater explosion, and a group of Minerals 
Management Service scientists claimed they were pressured to 
change the findings of internal studies if they predicted a sub-
stantial danger of an accident or harm to the Gulf ecosystem.136 
On May 16, BP began to draw some of the spewing oil up to the 
surface using a tube inserted into the leaking pipe; however, 
this strategy proved largely ineffective at recovering a substan-
tial portion of the oil.137 On May 18, the no fishing zone covered 
nineteen percent or about 90,000 square miles of the Gulf of 
Mexico.138 BP announced on June 6 that a containment cap was 
capturing 10,000 bpd.139 On July 7, the Associated Press re-
leased an investigation indicating that there were 27,000 
abandoned oil wells in the Gulf, some dating back to the 1940s, 
and many badly sealed.140 This investigation thus forced the 
public to confront the possibility that other major leaks were 
possible. On July 15, BP finally stopped the flow of oil for the 
first time in nearly three months.141 And about three weeks 
later on August 4, BP executed a successful ‘static kill,’ and a 
cement plug introduced on September 19 left the well effective-
ly dead and the crisis officially over.142 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN IMPACTS 
Although the oil leak has been stopped, there are contin-
ued disputes over the environmental impacts of the spill. For 
example, it is unclear to what extent oil will continue to pollute 
the Gulf coast, whether species such as the dwarf seahorse can 
overcome the loss of so much of its habitat, and whether disper-
sants used during cleanup efforts may have unforeseen conse-
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quences on the environment.143 
In a July 2010 report, the Scientific American noted that 
oil often includes highly toxic compounds—such as 
napthalenes, benzene, toluene, and xylenes—capable of seri-
ously affecting humans, animals, and plants.144 With inhalation 
and ingestion of these compounds being the most dangerous 
mode of exposure, there is a risk of mutations that can reduce 
fertility and cause cancer and other serious problems.145 Some 
16,000 species inhabit the Gulf, and it is difficult to predict 
what long-term effects the oil spill will have on them.146 
Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Pre-
paredness interviewed 1200 adults on the Gulf Coast during 
the oil spill and found that the spill had seriously impacted the 
health and economic viability of Gulf Coast communities.147 
Twenty percent of Gulf Coast residents reported a drop in in-
come, and more than twenty-five percent thought they might 
have to move away from the Gulf.148 Forty percent said they 
had experienced physical health problems that they attributed 
to the spill, and thirty percent reported that their children had 
experienced physical health issues or mental distress from the 
spill.149 
African Americans, Southeast Asians, and Native Ameri-
cans in the region are often heavily dependent on the seafood 
industry for jobs.150 The National Environmental Justice Advi-
sory Council called for federal agencies to target disaster re-
sponse efforts to communities of color and Native Americans, 
                                                          
 143. Id. The difficulties encountered in closing the well are discussed in BP 
OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 129–70. 
 144. David Biello, Lasting Menace, SCI. AM., July, 2010, at 16. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Survey of Coastal Residents Shows Gulf Oil Spill Has Significant Im-
pact on Families, SCI. DAILY (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/relea 
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 149. Id. 
 150. See Native American Group Hit Hard By Oil Spill, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(June 3, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
127405886&sc=emaf (transcript available with online recording); Mark 
Schleifstein, Environmental Justice Concerns Arising from Gulf of Mexico Oil 
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McGinnis, BP Oil Spill Spurs More Action for Gulf Environmental Justice, 
SUITE101 (July 11, 2010), http://www.suite101.com/content/bp-oil-spill-spurs-
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groups that have historically been overlooked.151 In response to 
concerns that the oil spill was having disproportionate effects 
on minority communities, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson 
added staff to incorporate environmental justice concerns, in-
cluding access to better consultation with government and en-
vironmental testing information.152 “People of the Gulf Coast 
need our support today more than ever before,” Jackson said.153 
She concluded, “The people who are most vulnerable to the im-
pacts of this spill must be empowered during our response and 
the long-term recovery.”154 
The Vietnamese community in the Gulf provides a power-
ful example of how certain minority groups face particular dan-
gers after the oil spill. Many Vietnamese in the Gulf are refu-
gees whose families have fished for generations.155 Many 
Vietnamese in the region do not possess other skill sets. Fur-
thermore, many in this Vietnamese community have poor Eng-
lish language skills, and adjusting to depleted fisheries will 
thus involve this additional language hurdle.156 During the oil 
spill crisis, the federal government also did not do a great job of 
communicating the details of the fishing closures to non-
English speakers.157 Some older Vietnamese fishermen were 
stopped and fined because they did not know that areas were 
closed to fishing.158 
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern in the environmen-
tal justice community has been the disposal of oil-related debris 
in communities of color. BP has been relying on landfills in 
neighborhoods where mainly African Americans, Latinos, and 
Asians live.159 BP’s federally approved waste disposal plan 
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ships oil spill garbage to nine dump sites in the South.160 In five 
out of nine of the facilities, minorities comprise a majority of 
residents living near the disposal facilities.161 People of color 
comprise about twenty-six percent of the population in coastal 
counties.162 The disproportionate environmental burden BP’s 
dumping plan places on minority communities compounds the 
burden these communities already bear, including the difficulty 
of the Hurricane Katrina recovery, economic paralysis, and ra-
cial inequality.163 
The Houma Nation and other Native American groups fear 
that the cultural and economic impacts from the loss of fishing 
activities will be too great to overcome.164 The United Houma 
Nation is an Indian Tribe with 17,000 members that lives in 
the bayous of Southeast Louisiana.165 The tribe is recognized by 
the state of Louisiana, but is not federally recognized, which 
means that the tribe does not enjoy the benefits inherent to 
federal recognition such as support by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs.166 Like other coastal communities, many members of the 
tribe are economically and culturally tied to the fishing indus-
try.167 The oil spill is only the latest chapter of exploitation that 
the oil industry has visited on the Houmas.168 In the 1950s and 
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communities for whom fishing is a lifestyle and a livelihood, suffered directly 
from the oil spill and face a difficult future.” BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 
4, at 194. Like Cajuns, tribal members also face disappearing lands. As a for-
mer chief explained, “When I was little there were fields that we [the Houma 
People] raised cattle and horses on. We had gardens and the kids played base-
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60s, the oil and gas industry conned poorly educated Houma 
Indians into signing away their land.169 Canal digging also al-
lowed saltwater intrusion into tribal areas.170 The Houmas are 
one more coastal community that is teetering on the brink, and 
it remains to be seen whether their unique culture and way of 
life can withstand yet another attack. 
It is not only minority cultures, such as the Houmas and 
Cajuns, that have been affected by the spill or the Gulf’s other 
problems. But these cultures are of special concern because 
they are less capable of protecting their interests through the 
democratic process or private sector. These cultures, with their 
unique histories, also add something distinctive to the Ameri-
can mix. We are at risk of losing these communities along with 
the land and the fisheries that support them. 
III. SEEKING A WAY FORWARD: SCATTERED RAYS OF 
SUNSHINE THROUGH DARK CLOUDS 
The Gulf presents a witch’s brew of chronic environmental 
harm, acute pollution, and threatened communities. Given the 
complexities of the problems and the organizational and politi-
cal difficulties, it would be unrealistic to propose any simple so-
lution. There are, however, some positive steps that could im-
prove the situation. Part A discusses the potential for more 
comprehensive ecosystem management in the Gulf, which could 
help address some of the chronic environmental problems. Part 
B discusses some ways that the BP Oil spill might provide the 
occasion for at least modest forward progress. 
A. CREATING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY 
COORDINATION 
The Gulf of Mexico Program (GMP) was initiated in 1988 
by the EPA as a non-regulatory program.171 The GMP was 
founded on principles of partnership, science-based infor-
mation, and citizen participation.172 The GMP was modeled af-
                                                          
ball. Now there is no such thing. The backyards are water.” Id. at 203. 
 169. Native American Group Hit Hard By Oil Spill, supra note 150. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally What is the Gulf of Mexico Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/whatisgmp.html (last updated May 
7, 2010) (describing the background, challenges, partnerships and priorities of 
the Gulf of Mexico Program). 
 172. Id. 
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ter the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay Programs, all striving 
to apply principles of adaptive management to address complex 
ecosystem degradation.173 The GMP accepted the reality that 
no one agency or institution has the capacity to “fix” the Gulf 
on its own. Instead, interested groups and individuals must 
work together to address the complex challenges facing the re-
gion.174 In 2009, building off of an effort in 2006 to set goals for 
regional partnership, the GMP, Gulf States, and Federal gov-
ernment completed a five-year Action Plan addressing the most 
pressing issues in the Gulf.175 The Action Plan centers on ad-
dressing hypoxia and ensuring the continued sustainability of 
the Gulf Coast economy.176 
The GMP was created and funded largely at the insistence 
of congressional delegations seeking to receive the same atten-
tion given to the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay.177 While 
these delegations did secure some funding for the GMP, it has 
remained insubstantial when compared to the Great Lakes and 
Chesapeake Bay counterparts. 
An impressive $475 million is being used to launch a new 
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative.178 President Obama’s Great 
Lakes Restoration Initiative is the largest such effort in two 
decades.179 In February 2010, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson 
issued a five-year Action Plan intended to “operationalize” the 
lofty goals previously set for restoration of the Great Lakes re-
gion.180 Jackson envisions spending a total of $2.2 billion for 
executing the Action Plan.181 The Great Lakes Interagency 
Task Force aligns eleven U.S. cabinet and federal agency heads 
                                                          
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE 
PROPOSED 2010 FUNDING PLAN 1 (2009) (describing the funding details of the 
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative). 
 179. GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE (Feb. 21, 2010), 
http://greatlakesrestoration.us/?p=445 (noting on its homepage that this is 
“the largest investment . . . in two decades” with the report elaborating on the 
Action Plan for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative). 
 180. Henry Henderson, Hope for an Effective “Great Lakes Action Plan”, 
NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/hhenderson/hope_for_an_effective_great_la.h
tml (reporting on the details and likely effectiveness of the “Great Lakes Ac-
tion Plan”). 
 181. Id. 
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to coordinate restoration efforts for the Great Lakes region.182 
This task force emphasizes collaboration between state and lo-
cal governments, Native American tribes, members of Con-
gress, citizen groups, and the Canadian government in order to 
achieve the protection and sustainable use of environmental 
and natural resources.183 
The outcome-oriented Great Lakes Restoration Initiative 
will focus on toxic substances and other selected areas of con-
cern; invasive species; near shore health and nonpoint source 
pollution; habitat and wildlife protection and restoration; and 
accountability, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and 
partnerships.184 All Great Lakes States currently have fish con-
sumption advisories.185 A new invasive species arrives in the 
Great Lakes on average every eight months.186 Pollution from 
nonpoint sources continues to wreak havoc on fragile Great 
Lakes ecosystems.187 Precious habitat is being attacked by any 
number of factors, including development and competition with 
invasive species.188 The new Initiative recognizes that the sta-
tus quo is the continued deterioration of the region and that se-
rious resources are needed to stem this downward trend.189 
Like the Great Lakes Program, the Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram has been well-coordinated and well-funded. The Chesa-
peake Bay Commission was created in 1980 to coordinate poli-
cy-making in the region and serve as the legislative arm of the 
Chesapeake Bay Program.190 Fifteen legislators from three 
states—Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania—the governors 
of each of these states, and three citizen representatives work 
together to manage biodiversity, land conservation, and water 
quality.191 
                                                          
 182. Great Lakes Interagency Task Force, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/iatf/ (last updated Apr. 7, 2009). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See generally GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 189, 
at 16. 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Policy for the Bay, CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, http://www.chesbay.us/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (describing the members and history of the Chesa-
peake Bay Commission). 
 191. Id. 
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The specific responsibilities of the Commission are the fol-
lowing: 
Identifying concerns requiring interjurisdictional coordination and 
cooperation; [c]ollecting, analyzing, and disseminating information 
pertaining to the region and its resources for the respective legislative 
bodies; [r]ecommending legislative and administrative actions neces-
sary to encourage effective and cooperative management of the bay; 
[r]epresenting the common interests of the member states as they are 
affected by the activities of the federal government; [p]roviding an ar-
bitration forum to serve as an advisory mediator for conflicts among 
the states.192 
Over a ten-year period ending in 2004, Maryland, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia invested $2.7 bil-
lion to restore the Chesapeake Bay.193 Eleven federal agencies 
contributed an additional $972 million.194 These funds were 
specifically used for “water quality improvements, sound land 
use, vital habitat protection and restoration, living resource 
protection and restoration, and stewardship and community 
engagement.”195 
While the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay are clearly 
important to the welfare of the United States, it is difficult to 
provide an explanation for why federal funding for these two 
regions should so dramatically outpace that for the Gulf of 
Mexico. Taking the Great Lakes region as an example, it is ob-
vious why it makes sense to protect an area that provides some 
thirty million Americans with drinking water and represents 
the foundation of a multi-billion dollar economy.196 Still, the 
Gulf of Mexico, with its wealth of resources and many coastal 
communities, would seem to be of similar significance to the 
nation. Yet, congressional appropriations for the GMP peaked 
in 1993, 1994, and 1995, at just over $4 million.197 Since 1995, 
funding for GMP has actually been in decline, despite the con-
tinued challenges facing the region.198 In 1999, the extramural 
budget was nearly halved from its peak, standing at $2.2 mil-
                                                          
 192. R.I. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BAY TRUST COMMISSION FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2004). 
 193. Funding and Financing, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/fundingandfinancing.aspx?menuitem=14907 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (reporting on the costs associated with the restora-
tion of the Chesapeake Bay). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 179, at 6. 
 197. Belefski & Norton, supra note 77, at 339–40. 
 198. Id. 
2 FARBER FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  12:19 PM 
64 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
lion.199 The GMP office has only 13.8 full-time employees.200 
Considering these numbers alone, it is not surprising that the 
GMP has not been able to turn the tide on environmental de-
cline in the region. 
As of 2004, the Great Lakes Program and Chesapeake Bay 
Program were funded at a combined $35 million per year.201 
Although the Gulf of Mexico is the most economically produc-
tive body of water in North America, relied upon by millions to 
provide income, the Gulf only receives a fraction of the funding 
commanded by the Great Lakes and Chesapeake regions.202 
Unlike the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay Programs, the 
GMP must be funded each year from EPA’s operating budget, 
thus creating an additional layer of unpredictability of fund-
ing.203 Although the GMP strives to make the most of the fund-
ing through the use of communications, education, and part-
nerships, it simply does not have the resources to ensure the 
protection of public health, stem the influx of pollutants, or re-
store habitats.204 While there have been individual success sto-
ries, such as the restoration of the Bahia Grande wetlands, 
many other ecosystems have been left in steady decline.205 
New programs to support Gulf restoration have been pro-
posed by the Obama Administration, but the details of some of 
these federal plans remain vague, and the financing is viewed 
as inadequate to reverse a history of environmental neglect.206 
There have been some reasons to be optimistic, “including a 
new four-year, $320 million federal initiative dedicated to sub-
stantially reducing the nitrogen coming into the gulf by work-
                                                          
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Funding and Financing, supra note 193 (“[s]ince 1995, the EPA 
funding . . . has remained steady at about $20 million annually); Great Lakes 
National Program Office, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov/greatlakes 
/about.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2009) (“USEPA’s Great Lakes National 
Program Office . . . [has] a budget of almost $15 million). 
 202. Belefski & Norton, supra note 77, at 333, 339–40. 
 203. Id. at 339–40. 
 204. Id. at 354–55. 
 205. Diaz & Rosenberg, supra note 72, at 926–27; James Pinkerton, Bahia 
Grande Transformed from Barren to Beautiful, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 2, 2005), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Bahia-Grande-transformed-
from-barren-to-beautiful-1574830.php. 
 206. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. 
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ing with agricultural states upriver.”207This initiative is 
squarely directed at reducing hypoxia, but it remains unclear 
the extent to which this commitment will actually be able to 
prevent the flow of nitrogen into the Gulf of Mexico.208 Further, 
while the hypoxia issue is one of the most significant problems 
facing the Gulf, it is not the only issue; other problems will go 
unabated. 
In April 2010, the GMP announced another positive devel-
opment: the Gulf of Mexico Foundation, a private non-profit or-
ganization, will receive $1.2 million to coordinate habitat con-
servation and restoration efforts in the Gulf of Mexico.209 The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) es-
tablished a regional partnership with the Gulf of Mexico Foun-
dation in 2001 in an effort to maximize resources allocated to 
restore marsh and wetland habitats.210 Yet—although a step in 
the right direction—it is doubtful that the Gulf of Mexico 
Foundation will make a significant impact with such limited 
funding. 
The Obama Administration also points to the Interagency 
Ocean Policy Task Force as an example of its efforts to improve 
the condition of the Gulf.211 Through the task force, the Admin-
istration has set forth an initial gulf restoration road map, alt-
hough details remain vague and uncertain.212 The Obama Ad-
ministration has already hedged on the potential effectiveness 
of the task force, as EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has 
warned that “thorny jurisdictional problems between the feder-
al government and the states” limit the ability of the federal 
government to take forceful action in the Gulf.213 
Nevertheless, encouraging signs should not be minimized 
or ignored. President Obama has highlighted the national sig-
nificance of the Gulf and the need for serious restoration.214 
                                                          
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. GMF Receives $1.2 Million for Habitat Conservation, GULF MEX. 
ALLIANCE (Apr. 2010), http://www.gulfmex.org/newsletter/spring2010. 
html#habitat. 
 210. Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Provides 
$250,000 to the Gulf of Mexico Foundation (Nov. 15, 2001), 
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2001/nov01/noaa01r114.html. 
 211. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. 
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 214. Erik Stokstad, Looking Beyond the Spill, Obama Highlights Long-
term Restoration, 328 SCIENCE 1618 passim (2010). 
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Prior to President Obama, the last president who is said to 
have expressed any serious interest in the Gulf was Theodore 
Roosevelt, a century earlier.215 
In an October 5, 2010 executive order, the President may 
have taken the largest step forward by establishing another 
task force—the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force—
composed of federal agency officials and state representatives, 
with the objective of coordinating federal efforts and developing 
a restoration strategy for presidential consideration.216 Ecosys-
tem restoration is broadly defined: 
“Ecosystem restoration” means all activities, projects, methods, and 
procedures appropriate to enhance the health and resilience of the 
Gulf Coast ecosystem, as measured in terms of the physical, biologi-
cal, or chemical properties of the ecosystem, or the services it pro-
vides, and to strengthen its ability to support the diverse economies, 
communities, and cultures of the region. It includes activity that ini-
tiates or accelerates the recovery of an ecosystem with respect to its 
health, integrity, and sustainability. It also includes protecting and 
conserving ecosystems so they can continue to reduce impacts from 
tropical storms and other disasters, support robust economies, and 
assist in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change.217 
It remains to be seen whether this task force will be suc-
cessful in devising an effective and politically feasible plan, but 
it does provide hope that the attitude of indifference in the re-
gion can be broken. 
The problems facing the Gulf could not be solved overnight 
even by an omnipotent regulatory program with an unlimited 
budget. It is inappropriate to use such an idealized regulatory 
as our benchmark for assessing progress. Rather, we need to 
concentrate on moving the status quo in the right direction, 
and in particular on creating a more viable forum for state and 
federal officials to coordinate their actions and develop joint 
programs. The Obama Administration seems to be moving in 
the right direction on these issues, although as with all things 
political, the future remains unpredictable. 
B. THE BP OIL SPILL AS THE OCCASION FOR NEW INITIATIVES 
Some leaders in the Gulf States believe that a dramatic in-
flux of funding for Gulf restoration efforts and infrastructure 
improvements could go a long way towards securing the future 
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 216. Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
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of the Gulf States. American engineers point to the Nether-
lands as an example of where a sustained and serious commit-
ment to flood control has minimized the risk of future flood-
ing.218 American engineers claim that the Dutch are not doing 
anything particularly innovative or unique; rather, they have 
been willing to spend more than $15 billion to combat the pro-
spect of future flooding.219 It is expected that even more may be 
required to restore the Gulf.220 However, while the flood control 
infrastructure of the Netherlands is impressive, it provides lim-
ited insight on how the Gulf of Mexico can address its own 
unique environmental concerns. As anyone who has visited 
both would surely realize, Louisiana is not Holland, and the 
problems facing the two are different in important respects. 
For environmental restoration and flood control to be sim-
ultaneously pursued, policymakers must keep both goals in 
mind at all times. Further, while the federal government has 
discussed the possibility of increasing funding to Louisiana 
flood control, there are some doubts as to whether the Army 
Corps of Engineers and Louisiana state government are really 
in a position to work a dramatic improvement to Louisiana’s 
flood infrastructure.221 While it may be true that funding limi-
tations substantially affect the Gulf States and that the Neth-
erlands has shown what can be accomplished with a heavy fi-
nancial commitment, the complicated and connected challenges 
of flood control and environmental restoration likely cannot be 
solved with increased funding alone, even if that funding were 
to be forthcoming. 
This section considers some more modest steps toward 
strengthening the planning process and providing better insti-
tutional infrastructure to support future planning and regula-
tory efforts. The suggestions here are not radical or transform-
ative, but they may cumulatively provide momentum for the 
process of putting effective environmental protections in place. 
Having invested considerable effort and funding over the 
course of the last century in creating the problems that now be-
set the Gulf, we cannot expect overnight solutions. 
                                                          
 218. Brett Martel, Louisiana Delegation Studies Flood Control Systems in 
the Netherlands, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.highbeam.com/ 
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 220. Id.; BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 210 (providing estimates of 
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 221. Martel, supra note 218. 
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1. Improved Regulatory Tools 
Despite reasons to remain pessimistic, the BP oil spill con-
tinues to represent an important opportunity to reverse the 
trend towards environmental and cultural destruction of the 
Gulf of Mexico. For instance, the spill has already resulted in 
limiting the categorical exclusions that formerly exempted so 
much oil and gas leasing activity from scrutiny under National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).222 As Professor Oli-
ver Houck explains, “[a]t bottom, the problem is vision. Neither 
the Corps nor the state [of Louisiana] has the history, appetite, 
or even the legal authority to take on the job of planning and 
managing a sustainable Louisiana coastal zone.”223 Houck thus 
makes the difficult but compelling argument that the Gulf 
Coast cannot be fully restored, and in fact, the United States as 
a society and the Gulf States in particular must begin a frank 
discussion about how much of the Gulf Coast can be restored 
and where people can most securely reside.224 Houck notes that 
NEPA could be a useful tool for evaluating the Gulf coast’s real 
alternatives.225 If it is to fulfill this promise, however, it needs 
to be taken seriously as a planning tool rather than viewed as 
an annoying paperwork requirement. As with other planning 
efforts, NEPA will be most useful if it is used in conjunction 
with scenario planning and with special emphasis on impacts 
on the most vulnerable ecosystems and communities, such as 
Gulf Coast coastal communities.226 
Another potentially useful tool is Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act (CZMA), which provides an under-utilized lever for 
states to control oil and gas development.227 Section 307 of the 
                                                          
 222. Boemre Comprehsenive Review of Its Categorical Exclusions for Outer 
Continental Shelf Decisions, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG., & 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/compliance/nepa/policy/ce/in 
dex.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 223. Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed 
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. 
L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2007). 
 224. Id. at 1083. 
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 226. See Daniel A. Farber, The Challenge of Climate Adaptation: Assessing 
Current Planning and the Need for Action-Forcing Requirements, J. ENV. L. 
(2011), available at http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/08 
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 227. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006); see Sam Kalen, The BP Macondo Well Explo-
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CZMA requires federal agencies to carry out any activities 
“that affect . . . any land or water use or natural resource of the 
coastal zone” consistently (to the maximum extent possible) 
with the state coastal zone plan.228 The underutilization of the 
CZMA has been partly the result of indefensible resistance by 
federal leasing authorities, which the Obama Administration 
should terminate post-haste. 229 Despite its political ties to the 
petroleum industry, the State of Louisiana actually had tried to 
prevent some destructive development using its powers under 
the CZMA, despite being supine on other occasions, so a change 
in federal policy could have practical impact.230 Other Gulf 
States should be encouraged to strengthen their currently weak 
CZMA programs.231 
It is also time to address the problem of coordinating Gulf 
policy. We now have something of a surplus of Gulf coordinat-
ing agencies: the Restoration Task Force, the GMP, and the 
Gulf of Mexico Alliance. In an ideal world, these groups would 
be consolidated. Failing that, perhaps a Gulf coordinating fo-
rum could be established where representatives of these differ-
ent groups could exchange information and harmonize their 
plans. Although it was underfunded and proved unable to cope 
with fierce disputes among stakeholders, the former joint Cali-
fornia-federal collaboration—known as CALFED—provides one 
model for “modular” partnerships between regulatory authori-
ties.232 
Money may or may not be the root of all evil, as the saying 
has it, but it is definitely a prerequisite for combating some of 
those same harms. As we saw earlier, regulators, public inter-
est groups, and scientists have been starved of funding in the 
Gulf.233 The next subsection addresses some routes to remedy-
ing that situation at least in part. Stronger institutional and 
informational infrastructure are as crucial for long-term sus-
tainability as physical infrastructure, and like physical infra-
structure, they do not come free. 
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2. Using Post-Spill Funding to Create Needed Institutional 
Infrastructure 
Money of various kinds will flow into the Gulf region as a 
result of the spill. Most of the money will undoubtedly be used 
to address the immediate harms caused by the spill, but the 
Gulf will be just as vulnerable in the future unless some of the 
funding is used to strengthen critical institutions needed for 
sustainability. 
The September 2010 Mabus Report calls for the President 
to urge Congress to pass legislation that would dedicate a por-
tion of Clean Water Act civil penalties paid by those responsible 
for the spill to those impacted by it. 234 Under the current sys-
tem, money collected under the Clean Water Act must be de-
posited into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and cannot be 
put into the Gulf Coast Recovery Fund.235 The Mabus Report 
recommends that this policy be changed to allow the Clean Wa-
ter Act civil penalties to flow into the Gulf Coast Recovery 
Fund, that a Gulf Coast Recovery Council be established to 
manage these funds and regional recovery efforts, that a per-
centage of the civil penalties be directed to the Gulf States, and 
that some money be set aside for responding to future spills.236 
If implemented, this source of funding could also be used to 
strengthen the GMP, so as to help ensure that the results of 
restoration are not subject to further degradation. 
Informational infrastructure in the region also needs 
strengthening. BP has already pledged $500 million over the 
next ten years for scientific research by Gulf Coast universities, 
of which $35 million has already gone out as fast-track grants 
to study the impact of the spill.237 The funds will be adminis-
tered by the Gulf of Mexico Alliance, a partnership of the five 
Gulf Coast States.238 This funding will strengthen our infor-
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mation base about the ecosystems in the region, but it may also 
help strengthen the capacity of these universities to remain ac-
tive in the future in this area of research. 
Besides better science, we also need better estimates of 
ecosystem services for use in cost-benefit analysis. At the fed-
eral level, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is central to current 
agency decisions but its legitimacy is sharply contested. For the 
past three decades, regulatory agencies, like the EPA, have 
been required to perform cost-benefit analyses and to presump-
tively base their decisions on the results.239 While CBA is con-
troversial, it shows no sign of disappearing, and it is important 
that the crucial ecosystem services provided by the Gulf be 
properly valued when the federal government makes deci-
sion.240 This is another area where the oil spill is likely, ironi-
cally, to provide useful assistance, as the government seeks to 
establish natural resources damages.241 Section 1002(b)(2)(A) of 
the Oil Pollution Act authorizes the federal government or oth-
er public trustees to recover “[d]amages for injury to, destruc-
tion of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the 
reasonable costs of assessing the damage.”242 Thus, the litiga-
tion process itself will generate a great deal of valuable scien-
tific and economic information about the Gulf coast.243 
Civil litigation could be another source of funding for insti-
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papers reflecting the spectrum of views about CBA and its validity, see COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2000); REFORMULATING 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds. 2009); 
RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST 
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HEALTH (2008); Daniel H. Cole, “Best Practice” Standards for Regulatory Bene-
fit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES. IN LAW & ECON. 1 (2007). 
 240. For further discussion of the ecosystem services approach, see James 
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Ser-
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 241. See James W. Boyd, How Do You Put a Price on Marine Oil Pollution 
Damages, RESOURCES, Summer 2010, at 22. 
 242. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 243. The effort to collect the relevant scientific data is described in Mat-
thew P. Coglianese, The Importance of Determining Potential Chronic Natural 
Resource Damages From the Deepwater Horizon Accident, 40 ENV. L. REP. 
11,100 (2010). 
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tutional infrastructure. Class action litigation is already pend-
ing as a result of the spill.244 Frequently, there are insufficient 
claimants to use up all of a class recovery, and the funds are 
then allocated through settlement or by the court in order to 
provide indirect benefits to the class members.245 Under the cy 
pres doctrine, judges enjoy broad discretion to allocate the 
funds, although uses that have some nexus to the subject of the 
litigation are usually favored.246 These funds could well be used 
to strengthen environmental groups in the Gulf region and 
strengthen environmental programs at Gulf colleges and uni-
versities. Without reliable scientific information from trusted 
local sources, action to save the Gulf will remain elusive—
though obviously information by itself is no guarantee of an 
appropriate regulatory response. 
Private philanthropy could also serve a valuable role in 
strengthening civil society in the Gulf region. The available 
amounts of money are not likely to be vast. But, environmental 
actors in the Gulf are so poorly funded that even small infu-
sions of cash could have a dramatic impact. A federal judge 
could well foster such funding during the cy pres process by 
taking “bids” from organizations, with the value of the bid to be 
judged partly on the basis of merit (proposed projects, prior 
record of success, strong institutional capacity) and partly on 
the organization’s securing a commitment for matching funds 
from the charitable sector. This would allow cy pres funds to be 
leveraged with private philanthropy. 
The current financial weakness of key institutions in the 
Gulf region means that it would take huge amounts of funding 
to fully remedy the situation. On the other hand, because the 
current baseline is low, the marginal effect of additional fund-
ing may be relatively large. Thus, even modest increases in 
funding could have significant effects on the vitality and activi-
ty of these institutions. 
                                                          
 244. By June, before the spill had ended, one website reported a “class ac-
tion lawsuit frenzy.” See Greg Jacobs, BP Oil Spill Sparks Class Action Law-
suit Frenzy, THE GOAL GROUP BLOG (June 4, 2010), 
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 245. Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the BP oil spill was yet another insult to 
already threatened human and biological communities. It 
would be hard to think of a more challenging venue for address-
ing environmental problems. The mix of problems is forbidding, 
including rapidly eroding wetlands, climate change, endan-
gered species, and a gigantic aquatic dead zone. These prob-
lems have mostly been the subject of not-so-benign neglect, 
akin to the regulatory neglect that cumulated in the disastrous 
BP oil spill. 
The political problems are also daunting. Five states bor-
der the Gulf, of which two are among the nation’s poorest and 
least environmentally oriented. Another thirty states contrib-
ute to the hypoxia problem. The oil industry has been a major 
contributor to the problems and exercises great political clout 
in the region. In short, the term “collective action problem” does 
not begin to explain the economic and political complexities. 
Successfully addressing these problems will require major 
new regulatory initiatives to prevent loss of wetlands, protect 
endangered species, and control hypoxia. It will also require 
heavy financial assistance to fund these initiatives and provide 
appropriate flood protection to the Gulf Coast. The political will 
for these measures may not exist as yet. This political will may 
depend on changes in our national politics beyond anyone’s 
power to control, and in any event is not on the immediate 
horizon. In the meantime, however, we must continue to work 
in the right direction and to create the infrastructure to imple-
ment more ambitious programs when the political climate al-
lows. 
The BP oil spill itself may indirectly assist in improving 
the situation. Through cy pres settlements, voluntary payments 
by BP, and perhaps civil penalties, the spill may provide fund-
ing to strengthen the institutional and scientific foundation for 
environmental regulation. The spill has already helped 
strengthen NEPA in its application to offshore oil and gas pro-
jects, and it could help revitalize CZMA. With luck, better regu-
lations will address the safety of future oil operations in the 
Gulf. Perhaps most importantly, the acute crisis of the spill has 
helped mobilize attention to the Gulf, which may help catalyze 
responses to the Gulf’s chronic ills. 
The Gulf’s problems are a preview of the difficulties we are 
likely to face in this century, with eroding coasts and wetlands 
and ecological disruption threatening coastal communities and 
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their livelihoods. Climate change will unsettle marine and 
coastal ecosystems in many parts of the world, while rising seas 
erode coastal areas and threaten cities with flooding. We need 
to learn how to deal with these issues today before they arise at 
greater scale and severity tomorrow. By beginning to focus on 
the problems of the Gulf, we will obtain valuable expertise with 
applications in other parts of the United States and in places 
around the world. 
Thus, the Gulf is a valuable laboratory for learning to ad-
dress the environmental upheavals we can expect to come. But 
the Gulf is also worth saving for its own sake. As Mike Tidwell, 
the journalist whose words began this article, has aptly said, 
“What’s being lost is an American treasure, a place as big as 
the Everglades and just as beautiful.”247 
 
                                                          
 247. TIDWELL, supra note 1, at 6. 
